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Abstract: This study investigates the influence of migrant remittances on two
dimensions of the financial sector, namely, size and efficiency in a sample of 94 nonOECD economies. Evidence suggests that migrant remittances contribute to
increasing the size and efficiency of the financial sector. The study, in addition,
examines the impact of remittances on financial sector size and efficiency through
their interaction with the government ownership of banks. The results suggest that
remittances lead to larger increases in financial sector size in countries in which the
government ownership of banks is lower, and increases in efficiency in countries in
which the government ownership of banks is higher.
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1. Introduction
Remittance inflows into the developing economies have increased ten-fold from US
$31,058 million to US$327,591 million over the 1990 to 2008 period, accounting for
the second largest foreign exchange inflow next to foreign direct investment, and in
some cases the largest (World Bank, 2012). Migrant remittances can promote
financial development in the recipient countries by increasing the volume of deposits
with financial institutions. Remittances can also bring a larger proportion of a
country’s ‘unbanked’ population in contact with the formal financial system by
increasing the availability of credit and banking services to the public such as savings
accounts and small scale loans (IMF 2005).

The relation between remittances and the financial sector has been examined in the
studies of Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009), Aggarwal et al. (2006), Orozco and
Fedewa (2005), Munduca (2009), Gupta et al.(2009) among others. Giuliano and
Ruiz-Arranz (2009) conclude that remittances can promote economic growth in the
developing economies by enhancing financial sector development, particularly in
financially less developed economies. Aggrawal et al. (2006) find that migrant
remittances lead to financial sector development in the developing economies by
leading to increases in the aggregate volume of deposits and credit intermediated by
the banking sector. Examining the effect of remittances on poverty and financial
development in Sub-Saharan Africa, Gupta et al. (2009) find that remittances have a
positive effect on both poverty and financial development. In a case study of nine
financial institutions in South America, Orozco and Fedewa (2005) show that
financial institutions’ distribution of transfers, and financial services provided depend
on the resources of the institution and its existing presence in the community. While
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these studies emphasize the positive effects of remittances on financial sector size, the
effects of remittances on financial sector efficiency are less well understood.

Mundaca (2009) using a panel dataset from Latin America, shows that remittances
can further promote economic growth in economies with well developed financial
markets. Modelling the entry of banks into the remittance market, Alberola and
Salvado (2006) observe that banks as opposed to smaller money transmitter operators,
have the ability to offer lower remittance transmission fees thereby increasing the
volume of remittances into recipient countries. Freund and Spatafora (2008) on the
other hand, argue that formal transmission channels such as banks are more expensive
compared to informal transmission channels. In a panel dataset covering 104
countries, they show that remittances are transmitted through formal channels in
countries which have well developed financial systems. Acosta et al. (2009)
investigating the effects of remittances on the exchange rate on 109 developing and
transition economies find that upward pressure on exchange rates brought about by
the increase in remittances, are lower in countries with well developed financial
markets. While these studies are indirectly related to the hypothesis of financial sector
efficiency, there is no explicit reference to efficiency.

The present study is closely related to the literature that investigates the relation
between remittance flows and the financial sector. The studies hereto, have explored
the effects of remittance inflows on financial sector size. The majority of studies
undertaken on the impact of remittances on financial sector size as measured by the
ratio of deposits to GDP, private credit to GDP, and liquid assets to GDP, show that
migrant remittances have a positive influence on financial sector size. A study by
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Brown et al. (2011) however, suggests that remittances by reducing financial
constraints, reduces the demand for credit. The present study differs from the previous
literature in that it not only examines the effect of migrant remittances on financial
sector size, but also efficiency. The impact of remittance inflows on financial sector
efficiency are measured by overhead costs and net interest margins. If remittances
lead to an increase in efficiency this would benefit the public due to reduced overhead
costs and net interest margins. Increases in overhead costs and net interest margins on
the other hand, would lead a fall in financial sector efficiency.

A related issue that has not been explored is, the role played by government owned
banks in determining the magnitude and efficiency of remittances. In the developing
economies, the government plays a major role in setting up banks in rural areas and
providing access to finance. The role of the government in promoting financial sector
development has been highlighted in the work of Demirguc-Kunt (2006). Therefore,
the present study in addition, investigates if the impact of remittances on financial
sector size and efficiency, are conditional on the degree of government ownership of
banks. There are two views associated with government involvement in the financial
sector. The development view associated with Gerschenkron (1962) and Lewis
(1950), and the political view associated with Kornai (1979) and Shleifer and Vishney
(1994). The political view argues that the government, by pursuing its own political
objectives is subject to conflicting interests which can lead to inefficient outcomes,
primarily in economies with weak property rights. This could lead to increased
interest margins and overhead costs. The development view on the other hand, argues
that the government can help overcome market failures and promote development
through lower costs and increased access to finance, particularly in the developing
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economies. Government ownership can also play an important role in retaining
savings within a financial system where regulation is not of high quality (Shortland
2009). Consequently the contribution of this study is threefold: one, to investigate the
effects of migrant remittances on financial sector size; two, to examine the effect of
remittances on financial sector efficiency; and three, to explore the relation between
migrant remittances and financial sector development through the government
ownership of banks channel. The study is restricted to a sample of 94 non-OECD
nations.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 states the hypotheses. Section
3 examines some country characteristics. Section 4 describes the data and estimation
methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and conclusions are
summarised in Section 6.

2. Hypotheses
This study tests the hypotheses that:
1) Migrant remittances influence the size of the financial sector
2) Migrant remittances influence the efficiency of the financial sector.
3) Despite the fact that remittances can affect the financial sector through a number
of channels, this study then goes on to investigate if remittances influence the
financial sector through the government ownership of banks channel. To test this
hypothesis, the remittance variable is interacted with the government ownership of
banks. This interaction term will show the degree to which the prevalence of state
owned banks matter for the influence of remittances on financial sector development.
Given that remittances have a positive effect on financial sector size, a positive
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interaction term would imply that remittances have a larger effect on financial sector
size in countries with high government ownership of banks, while a negative
interaction term would indicate that remittances have a larger effect on financial
sector size in countries with low government ownership of banks. Also, given that
remittances lead to greater financial sector efficiency in terms of lower overhead costs
and net interest margins, a positive interaction term would imply that remittances
have a larger effect on financial sector efficiency in countries with low government
ownership of banks, while a negative interaction term would indicate that remittances
have a larger effect on financial sector efficiency in countries with high government
ownership of banks.
Migrant Remittances, Government Ownership and the Size and Efficiency of the
Financial Sector
Remittances are an important, and sometimes, the only means of access to financial
services by households in low income economies. Remittances help low income
households to accumulate funds which can be used to finance future consumption or
investment. These funds may be used to smooth consumption in the event of
unexpected fluctuations in income (Yang and Choi 2007), and increase the propensity
to save. The accumulation of savings in turn, can create the opportunity for lending
these funds back into the community. The hypothesis that remittances have a positive
impact on financial sector size is supported in the work of Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz
(2009), Aggarwal et al. (2006), Orozco and Fedewa (2005), Gupta et al. 2009. The
argument underlying this hypothesis is that remittances contribute to financial sector
development by promoting “financial literacy” in remittance receiving households,
increasing the demand for and use of banking services, and the availability of credit in
the financial sector (see Brown et al. 2011). Here, the mobilization of remittances by

6

financial institutions, contribute to alleviating financial constraints in the credit
market (Hernandez 2009). Brown at al. (2011) however, in a study of Azerbaijan and
Kyrgyzstan, find that the converse holds. That is, remittances act as a substitute for
credit, reducing household financial constraints, leading to a lower demand for credit.
This argument runs counter to the financial literacy hypothesis. Remittances may also
not lead to an increase in the volume of deposits in the financial system if they are
consumed, or households save this money in other forms (Hernandez 2009).

While there is a literature that investigates the effect of remittance transfer costs on
efficiency, Alberola and Salvado (2006), Beck and Martinez Peria (2011), Freund and
Spatafora (2008), there is an absence of studies which investigate the effect of
remittances on financial sector efficiency1. The present study therefore, is a first
attempt at investigating empirically, the hypothesis that remittances influence
financial sector efficiency. According to the financial literacy argument, remittances,
is an effective means through which the rural population can be integrated into the
formal financial system. Hence, through what channels do banks leverage remittances
to make financial services more efficient? Changes in overhead and other operating
costs are reflected in bank interest rate margins, which are passed on by banks to
depositors and lenders (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 2004). Accordingly, if
remittances increase the availability of credit through larger deposits, they can
contribute to lowering overhead costs and net interest margins. Evidence shows that
increased deposits have led to an increase in bank liquidity, leading to a fall in bank
interest rates in some countries. For example, remittances contributed to an increase in
deposits in Nepal, from Nepalese Rupees 697 in July 2011 to Rupees 743 billion in

1

The OECD (2006) cites reduced banking costs as a potential benefit of increased remittances.
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December 2011, and an increase in lending from Rupees 521 to Rupees 542 billion in
the same period. This in turn led to a lowering of interest rates in Nepal (The
Kathmandu Post 2011). Remittances can also act as a substitute for inefficient credit
markets by enabling individuals to start business without collateral or high borrowing
costs (Hernandez 2009, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009). Another channel through
which increased efficiency can be achieved is through the increase in bank reserves.
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) show that increased bank reserves reduce
interest margins and profits particularly, in developing countries. Remittances have
led to an increase in bank reserves in a number of developing countries. Therefore,
remittances by increasing bank reserves, can reduce overhead costs and interest
margins. Conversely, if remittances allow banks to earn monopolistic profits, this will
lead to higher bank overhead costs and net interest margins. Therefore banks can also
pass on higher operating and overhead costs to depositors and lenders (DemirgucKunt and Huizinga 2004). Besely (1994), however argues that monopoly may not
always be inefficient, for as lenders grow larger, their potential to diversify risk
increases. In this case, loans will be distributed efficiently despite the aim of
extracting the surplus from borrowers.

How does the government ownership of banks affect the size and quality of the
financial sector? La Porta et al. (2002) and Bath et al. (2001), have shown that a high
government ownership of banks can slow down financial sector development, lead to
a concentration of bank lending and slow down economic growth. This is supported
by Dinc (2005) who shows that a high government ownership of banks can lead to an
inefficient channelling of credit to government officials. Bertrand et al. (2004) in a
study of the effects of banking deregulation on the industrial structure in France,
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argue that deregulation relaxing government intervention in bank lending has led to
greater competition in the credit market. Hence, the empirical evidence suggests that
the government ownership of banks can reduce financial sector size. The government
ownership of banks however, has been defended on the basis that these banks can
finance large scale projects that can generate positive externalities for the economy as
a whole (Dinc 2005). Besely (1994) further shows that market failures in developing
countries justify government intervention in rural credit markets. This view is echoed
by Andrianova et al. (2008) who argue that the government sector can establish banks
to jump start economies with very low institutional quality.

Guisio et al. (2006) in a study of bank competition of Italian states shows that
liberalisation leads to an increase in bank efficiency by contributing to a fall in
interest rate spreads. Andrianova et al. (2008) note that subsidized state banks have an
advantage over private banks, as they can offer more competitive interest rates
compared to private banks to certain sectors. Although subsidisation does not
necessarily imply increased efficiency, it would contribute to lower interest rate
margins. Hence, if remittances contribute to an increase in the volume of deposits and
the availability of credit, government banks to offer more competitive interest rates
compared to private banks.

Remittances have led to greater opportunity for financial inclusion. The governments
of many developing economies have been taking measures to increase financial
inclusion. In Uganda for example, banks now have centralised databases and money
can be sent to any part of the country within the same branch network in seconds at
no, or minimal cost. Banks have in addition, introduced improved infrastructure and
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financial literacy programmes (East African 2009). A number of countries in South
America, Asia and Africa, have introduced mobile phone banking. “With new
technology and computerisation of banking operations, new remittance products have
been introduced in the market, which have increased the speed, cost-effectiveness and
efficiency of the payments and settlement system. These include the National
Electronic Funds Transfer (NEFT), Electronic Clearing System (ECS), Real Time
Gross Settlement (RTGS) and ongoing endeavour at cheque truncation system leading
to a national payment and settlement system” (Mohapatra 2009). These measures can
be expected to increase access to finance and lower overhead costs and net interest
margins.

Providers aiming to create inclusive finance in developing countries comprise mainly
of publicly owned banks that practice a social purpose (UN DESA and UNCDF
2012). In developing countries, private and international banks usually cater to high
end customers, while government banks cater to rural and low income customers.
Government banks moreover, have larger banking networks that are required to
promote inclusive growth. Consequently, the “Government has an important role to
play in building an inclusive financial sector” (UN DESA and UNCDF 2012). The
role of the government in promoting financial sector development by developing the
necessary infrastructure, increasing financial sector competition, financial inclusion
and developing institution better suited to the needs of low income households is
highlighted in the work of Demirguc-Kunt (2006). Experience has shown that this
role can be largely supportive, but that government intervention can also impede
financial sector development” (UN DESA and UNCDF 2012). There have been no
studies investigating the effects of migrant remittances on financial sector size and
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efficiency through their interaction with the government ownership of banks. The
present study is undertaken with the aim of filling this gap.

3.

Country Characteristics

Figures 1 and 2 show remittance receipts for the countries under study for 2010. The
largest five recipients of remittances in the sample in absolute terms, are India (US
$54,035 million), China (US $53,038 million), the Philippines (US $21,423 million),
Bangladesh (US$10,852) and Nigeria (US $10,045 million). The largest five
recipients of remittances as a percentage of GDP are: Tajikistan (31%), Lesotho
(28.6%), Samoa (24.8%), Nepal and Moldova (23.2%) and Krygyz Republic (19.7%).
Figure 3 plots the relationship between the ratio of deposit money bank assets to GDP
and the ratio of migrant remittances to GDP for 2010. This preliminary analysis
suggests a positive relationship between the two variables.
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Figure 1: Remittance Inflows 2010 (US$ Million)

Source: World Development Indicators 2012
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Figure 2: Remittance Flows as % of GDP 2010

Source: World Development Indicators 2012

13

1

Figure 3: Deposit Bank Assets to GDP and Remittances to GDP
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Note: The regression represented by the fitted line reports a coefficient of 0.132 (Robust SE = 0.058),
N = 65, R2 = 0.03 from a regression of the ratio of deposit money banks assets to GDP to remittances
to GDP.

Figure 4 plots the ratio of remittances to GDP against the ratio of deposit banks assets
to GDP, and Figure 5 plots the ratio of remittances to GDP against the interest rate
margin for the countries for 2009, grouped by high and low government ownership of
banks. Countries in which the government owns over 50% of the banking system
assets (see Bath et al. 2001) are defined as countries with a high government
ownership of banks and those with less than 50%, countries with a low government
ownership of banks. Note that while there appears to be a positive relationship
between the ratio of remittances to GDP and ratio of deposit bank assets in the low
government ownership of banks group, the relationship between the two variables for
the high government ownership of banks group is marginally negative. Figure 5 on
the other hand shows that an increase in remittances leads to a fall in the interest
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margin in countries with a high government ownership of banks while remittances do
not appear to have an effect on the interest rate margin in countries with a low
government ownership of banks. Hence, a question that arises at this point is, do
migrant remittances lead to an increase in financial sector development in countries
with high or low government bank ownership?

Figure 4: Migrant Remittances and Deposit Bank Assets to GDP by Government
Ownership of Banks
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Figure 5: Migrant Remittances and Interest Rate Margin by Government Ownership
of Banks
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4.

Data and Estimation Methodology

4.1

Data

The study uses annual data over the 1990-2010 period for 94 countries. See Data
Appendix for list of countries, data sources and explanation. The sample constitutes a
representative cross section of the regions covering Eastern Europe and Central Asia,
the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and
the Pacific, South Asia and Africa. The high income OECD countries are excluded
from the analysis as the channels through which remittance inflows influence the
financial sector in these economies are likely to be different from other regions. It is
estimated that a large proportion of remittance flows are transmitted through informal
channels. A limitation of the study therefore, is that it is only able to capture official
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flows that are transmitted through formal channels2. The dependent variables in the
study are the financial sector size and efficiency variables. Financial sector size is
measured by: (1) the ratio of deposit banks assets to GDP (2) liquid assets to GDP (3)
the ratio of domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions to the
private sector to GDP. The provision of credit by the banking sector to the private
sector is also an indicator of the degree of activity of financial intermediaries.
Financial sector efficiency is measured by (1) the value of banks’ net interest margin
to total assets, and (2) banks’ overhead costs to total assets. Increased competition in
the financial sector should reduce overhead costs and interest margins. Therefore, if
these measures are low it would imply increased efficiency and vice versa. These
financial sector indicators are used by Aggarawal et al. (2006), Beck et al. (2003),
among others.

The main independent variable in the study is the ratio of migrant remittances to
GDP. These are formal remittances that are recorded in the National Accounts.
Migrant remittances are defined as the sum of workers’ remittances, compensation of
employees, and migrants’ transfers. Other independent variables in the preliminary
estimation include, the initial level of per capita income to capture the level of
development of a country, openness and inflation variables based upon the previous
literature. Studies have shown that current and capital account liberalisation have a
favourable impact on financial sector development (see Chinn and Ito 2002, Aggarwal
et al. 2006, Gupta et al.2009). The ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (Giuliano and
Ruiz-Arranz 2009, Gupta et al. 2009), the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP
(Gupta et al. 2009), and a dummy variable for the exchange rate regime (Gupta et al.
2

A study by Freund and Spatafora (2005) empirically estimate informal remittance flows. According
to them, informal remittance flows account for about 35%-75% of official remittances to developing
economies.
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2009), are used to capture the degree of openness of an economy. If a country follows
some form of fixed/managed/ crawling peg exchange rate regime, a dummy variable
of one is assigned to it and zero if the currency is allowed to float independently.
Inflation can discourage financial intermediation (Aggarwal et al. 2006) and also act
as a proxy for uncertainty and risk (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009). Therefore
inflation is used an explanatory variable in the empirical estimation that follows
(Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009, Gupta et al.2009).

Additional control variables are used to test the robustness of the results to the choice
of variables. A well developed financial system requires a proper legal and regulatory
framework. La Porta et al.(1997) show that countries in which legal systems provide
proper protection to investors against expropriation by entrepreneurs, are likely to
have larger and better developed financial markets. They argue that countries with
English Common law origin provide the highest investor protection while countries
with French law origin provide investors with the least protection. Hence, a dummy
variable is created for French legal origin. This dummy variable takes on a value of
one for French legal origin and zero otherwise. As migration is likely to be higher
from conflict ridden states, a dummy variable of one is assigned if a country
experienced a conflict during the period under study, that is, 1990-2007, and zero
otherwise. The level of financial literacy of a society can positively impact upon the
volume of remittances transmitted through formal channels and thereby on financial
sector development. Financial literacy cannot be measured directly. Following Beck
and Martinez Peria (2011) who use secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios to measure
financial literacy, the present study employs the secondary school enrolment ratio to
proxy for the level of financial literacy. The tertiary enrolment ratio is not used as
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fewer data points are available for tertiary enrolment. A well developed financial
system also requires to be accompanied by the necessary infrastructure and
technological know-how. Archibugi and Coco (2004), note that capital equipment and
machinery “representing a key component of embodied technological capacity” are
important for both developed and developing countries. They also note that the closest
substitute for this is gross fixed capital formation. Given that data for technological
know-how are limited, this is captured by the ratio of gross domestic fixed capital
formation to GDP. Moreover, data for gross fixed capital formation are available for
most countries and there is greater consistency in the data. As increased government
expenditure can increase bank concentration and reduce competitiveness by crowding
out private sector investment expenditure, the share of public consumption to GDP is
also considered. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) show that increased
ethnic/religious fractionalisation can impede financial sector development. Therefore
the religious fractionalisation measure of (Alesina et al. 2003) is employed to capture
the degree of fractionalisation of a society.

To investigate the hypothesis that remittances affect the financial sector through the
government ownership of banks channel, the ratio of migrant remittances to GDP is
interacted with the government ownership of banks from Barth, Caprio and Levine
(2001 updated in 2008).

4.2 Estimation Methods
The study uses both pooled OLS and system GMM methods to estimate the influence
of remittances on the financial sector.
The following model forms the basis of the preliminary OLS estimation:

19

Fii = aRit + xit β + υit

(1)

where Fit is the financial sector variable for country i in period t. Rit is the remittance
variable for country i in period t All control variables mentioned in Section 4 are
captured by the vector xit. υi is a random error term that captures all other variables.

In order to exploit the time series dimension of the data and individual country
specific effects correcting for any endogeneity bias in the explanatory variables, the
Arellano-Bover (1995)-Blundell Bond (1998) system GMM method is used. Blundell
and Bond (1998) show that the first differenced GMM procedure could cause large
finite-sample biases when used to estimate autoregressive models for fairly persistent
series for short panels. They also show that these biases could be reduced by
including additional moment conditions. That is the use of lagged first differences as
instruments for equations in levels, in addition to the lagged levels as instruments for
equations in first differences (Arellano and Bover 1995, Wooldridge 2002). Given the
fairly short panel in used in this study, this approach is considered to be superior to
the first differenced GMM procedure. Therefore, equation in levels (2), is
instrumented with lagged first differences of the variables, while the equation in first
differences, (3), is instrumented with lagged levels of the variables.
Fit = γFit-1 + aRit + xit β + µi + ηt + υit

(2)

Fit – Fit-1 = γ(Fit-1 - Fii-2) + a(Rit – Rii-1) + β( xit − xit-1) + ηt + (υit - υit-1)

(3)

The variable definitions are the same as for equation (1) with the lagged values of the
variables now entering the equations and µi representing a country specific effect and

ηt, a fixed time effect. The GMM estimator is based on the assumption that the error
terms are not serially correlated and that the explanatory variables are weakly
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exogenous or not correlated with future realizations of the error terms under which the
following moment condition holds for the first difference estimator:
E[Fit-s (υit - υit-1)]= 0; E[Rit-s (υit - υit-1)]= 0;

E[xit-s (υit - υit-1)]= 0

where i = 1…..n,

t = 3….T and s≥ 2.
and as mentioned above the levels equation is instrumented with lagged first
differences of the variables which leads to the additional moments condition:
E[∆Fit-s (µi + υit )] = 0; E[∆Rit-s (µi + υit )] = 0; E[∆xit -s (µi + υit )] = 0 for s =1.
Two diagnostic tests are carried out on the system GMM estimates. The Sargan test
for over-identifying restrictions under which the null hypothesis is that the
instruments are not correlated with the residuals. The second is the Arellano-Bond test
for second order correlation in the first differenced residuals.

5.

Empirical Estimation

OLS Estimation
Table 1 presents OLS results for the model. The dependent variable in column (1) is
Deposit Money Bank Assets to GDP, column (2) Private Sector Credit to GDP,
column (3) liquid assets to GDP, column (4) overhead costs to total assets, and
column (5), net interest margin to total assets. Estimation is initially carried out with
migrant remittances to GDP, the level of GDP per capita, the ratio of exports to GDP,
FDI to GDP, and an exchange rate dummy variable, all of which capture the degree of
openness of an economy and the rate of inflation as explanatory variables.
[Table 1, about here]
The results indicate that migrant remittances have a positive and significant impact on
the financial sector size variables. For example, column (1) indicates that a 1%
increase in remittances lead to a 0.03% increase bank deposits and column (2) that a
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1% increase in remittances lead to a 0.03% increase in private credit to GDP. An
increase in remittances lead to a fall in overhead costs and net interest margins. In
Column (4), a 1% increase in remittances lead to a 0.004% decrease in overhead costs
and in column (5), a 0.005% decrease in the net interest margin. The estimates on per
capita income are statistically significant and suggest that a higher per capita income
is associated with an increase in the financial sector size variables and lower overhead
costs and net interest margins. The coefficients on the ratio of exports to GDP is
statistically significant in all columns indicating that greater openness contributes to
an increase in financial sector size and rise in efficiency. Foreign direct investment is
statistically significant in columns (2), (4) and (5). Inflation has a significant negative
impact on both financial sector size and efficiency. The estimates on the exchange
rate variables are statistically significant in columns (1), (3) and (5) suggesting that
exchange controls exert a negative effect on the volume of deposits and liquid assets
to GDP and lead to an increase in the net interest margin.

Table 2 estimates the equations with additional control variables mentioned in Section
4. Including the secondary school enrolment ratio reduces the sample size
significantly however.
[Table 2, about here]
As before, the variable of interest, migrant remittances, have a significant positive
impact on both financial sector size and efficiency. Columns (1), (2) and (3) indicate
that a 1% increase in migrant remittances will lead to a 0.04% increase deposit
money bank assets to GDP, a 0.03% increase in credit to GDP and a 0.02% increase
in liquid assets to GDP respectively. The French legal origin dummy variable has a
significant negative impact on the size and efficiency of the financial sector in
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columns (2), (4) and (5). Openness as measured by exports to GDP has a statistically
significant positive impact on financial sector size and efficiency. FDI is statistically
significant only in column (3). Inflation exerts a significant negative effect on the
financial sector size and efficiency variables. In column (1) for instance, a 1%
increase in the rate of inflation will lead to a 0.06% fall in deposit bank assets. The
coefficient on the exchange rate dummy variable is statistically significant in all
columns except for column (3), suggesting that exchange rate controls lead to a fall in
the financial sector size variables and a rise in overhead costs and net interest
margins. The coefficients on secondary schooling are statistically significant
suggesting that financial literacy has a positive impact on financial sector size and
efficiency. The coefficients on government consumption are statistically significant in
columns (3) and (4) suggesting that increases in government consumption are
associated with increases in bank liquid assets and a rise in overhead costs. Population
growth has a significant positive effect on financial sector size and also leads to an
increase in the net interest margin. Gross domestic capital formation is statistically
significant in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) and the coefficient on religious
fractionalisation in column (1). The conflict dummy variable is significant in all
columns except for column (2). An increase in conflict reduces the volume of deposits
and the liquid assets held by banks. The results suggest that conflict also causes
overhead costs and net interest margins to fall.
GMM Estimation
Table 3 replicates the preliminary regressions in Table 1 using system GMM. The
one-step GMM estimator is used in the present study3. This yields standard errors that

3

Although the two-step estimator is more efficient for system GMM, Monte Carlo studies show that
the two-step GMM estimator converges to its asymptotic distribution very slowly. In finite samples, the
asymptotic standard errors associated with the two-step GMM estimators can be downward biased and
thus be an unreliable measure for inference (see Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001).
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are not only asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity but have also been found to
be more reliable for finite sample estimation (see Blundell and Bond 1998, Bond et al.
2001).
[Table 3, about here]
The results for the GMM estimation are consistent with those obtained under OLS
estimation in Table 1. The remittance variables continue to be highly statistically
significant. Exports to GDP is significant in all columns except for column (4) and
FDI is significant in columns (2) to (4). Exchange rate controls have a significant
negative impact on deposit money bank assets and private credit, and also lead to
increases in overhead costs. Inflation has a significant negative impact on financial
sector size and efficiency. The lagged values of the dependent variables are all
statistically significant reflecting a high degree of persistency in the variables. The
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions where the null hypothesis is that the
instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals, and the Arellano-Bond test for second
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, confirm that the moments
conditions cannot be rejected.

Table 4 replicates the regressions carried out in Table 2 with additional control
variables using system GMM. The results confirm the OLS findings that remittances
have a positive impact on financial sector development. Exports have a significant
positive effect on the financial sector size variables and inflation and exchange rate
controls a negative impact on financial sector development. Secondary schooling is
statistically significant in all columns and gross domestic capital formation in
columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) suggesting the importance of financial literacy and
infrastructure for financial sector development. There is some evidence of a negative
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effect of religious fractionalisation on financial sector development. Conflict has a
negative impact on bank deposits and leads to a fall in the net interest margin.
[Table 4, about here]

Government Ownership, Financial Sector Development and Migrant
Remittances
Table 5 reports results for the influence of remittances on the financial sector through
the government ownership channel. System GMM is used as this method best
addresses the possible endogeneity of migrant remittances and also accounts for the
effect of time invariant or very slowly changing government ownership of banks.
[Table 5, about here]
The overall results are consistent with those above with remittances leading to
increases in financial sector size and efficiency. The interaction terms on the
government ownership of banks x migrant remittances are statistically significant in
columns (1), (2) (4) and (5). The interaction terms in columns (1) and (2) suggest that
remittances lead to increases in the volume of deposits and private credit in countries
with low government bank ownership and the interaction terms in columns (4) and (5)
suggest that remittances lead to a fall in overhead costs and net interest margins in
countries with high government bank ownership.

The Model Disaggregated by Government Ownership of Banks
Next, the baseline model is re-estimated by dividing the sample into two groups -low
and high government ownership of banks. This is to compare how remittances
influence financial sector development in these two groups. The results are reported
in Table 6.
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[Table 6, about here]
The results are consistent with those obtained above in Table 5. Migrant remittances,
have a positive significant impact on deposit money bank assets, private credit and
liquid assets to GDP in the low government bank ownership group. Remittances also
have a positive significant impact on deposit money bank assets and private credit in
the high government bank ownership group. However, the coefficients on the
remittance variables in columns (1)-(3) are higher and statistically more significant
for the low government bank ownership group suggesting that remittances have a
larger positive impact on the financial sector size variables in the low government
ownership of banks group. For example, column (1) suggests that a 1% increase in
remittances will lead to a 0.04% increase in deposits in the low government bank
ownership group as opposed to a 0.02% increase in deposits in the high government
bank ownership group. The remittance coefficients in columns (4) and (5) suggest that
remittances lead to increased efficiency, or, a larger fall in overhead costs and net
interest margins in the high government bank ownership group. The remittance
coefficients in columns (4) and (5) are statistically significant for the high government
ownership group, however, not statistically significant for the low government
ownership group. These results are consistent with those obtained in Table 6 above.
An examination of the other variables show that per capita income has a positive
impact on the size and efficiency of the financial sector in both groups. An increase
in the ratio of exports to GDP exerts a positive significant impact on the financial
sector size variables and a fall in the net interest margin. FDI is not statistically
significant in the high government bank ownership group, however, has a positive
effect on private credit and the financial sector efficiency variables in the low
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government bank ownership group. Exchange rate controls and inflation influence the
financial sector size and efficiency variables negatively.

Robustness Tests
Several tests are carried out to ensure the robustness of the results. The study uses a
number of alternative measures of financial sector development to check the
robustness of the results to the measure of financial sector development. Financial
sector size is proxied by three different variables: the ratio of deposit banks assets to
GDP, liquid assets to GDP and domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial
institutions to the private sector to GDP. Financial sector efficiency is measured by
two variables: the value of banks’ net interest margin to total assets, and banks’
overhead costs to total assets. The results are robust to the measure of financial sector
development.

Several additional control variables are used to check the robustness of the results to
the conclusions of the study. These control variables which include, population
growth, secondary schooling, government consumption, gross domestic capital
formation, religious fractionalisation and a conflict dummy variable do not change the
overall conclusions of the study.

System GMM is used in addition to OLS to ensure that the results are robust to the
estimation procedure. The system GMM method allows correcting for the potential
endogeneity of migrant remittances and other explanatory variables. It also permits
the inclusion of time invariant regressors which would disappear in difference GMM.
Two diagnostic tests are carried out on the system GMM estimates, a Sargan test for
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overidentifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond test for second order serial
correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The Sargan test and the serial correlation
test confirm that the moments conditions cannot be rejected.
The sample is further disaggregated by the government ownership of banks to confirm
the finding that remittances have a stronger influence on financial sector size in
countries with a lower government ownership of banks and a stronger impact on
financial sector efficiency in countries with a higher government ownership of banks.
The disaggregated models confirm the findings derived in Table 5.

6.

Conclusions

This study examines the impact of migrant remittances on financial sector size and
efficiency. The study also investigates the effect of remittances on financial sector
size and efficiency through their interaction with the government ownership of banks.
The results suggest that remittances lead to an increase in financial sector size,
consistent with the findings of Aggarwal et al.(2006), Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz
(2009), Gupta et al. (2009). The results also suggest that remittances lead to a fall in
overhead costs and net interest margins. The interaction terms on bank ownership x
migrant remittances, and the government bank ownership disaggregated estimates,
suggest that remittances lead to an increase in the volume of deposits mobilised, credit
disbursed and liquid assets in countries with a low government ownership of banks.
Although remittances also lead to an increase in financial sector size in countries with
a high government ownership of banks, a greater increase in financial sector size is
experienced by the low government ownership of banks group.
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Appendix
Data Sources and Description:
- Ratio of Deposit Bank Assets to GDP, Domestic Credit by Deposit Banks and Other
Financial Institutions/ to GDP, Liquid Assets to GDP, Banks Net Interest Margin to
Total Assets, Banks’ Overhead Costs to Total Assets annual data 1990-2010: from
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999 updated in 2009) and World Development
Indicators 2012.
- Migrant Remittances to GDP data 1990-2010: World Development Indicators
- GDP per capita annual data 1990-2010 Purchasing Power Parity: World
Development Indicators.
- Foreign Direct Investment to GDP annual data 1990-2010: World Development
Indicators.
- Exports to GDP annual data 1990-2010: World Development Indicators.
- Exchange Rate Dummy Variable: Takes on a value of 1 if a country follows some
form of fixed/managed/crawling peg exchange rate regime and a value of 0 is the
currency of a country is allowed to float freely: from Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff
2008.
- Inflation (consumer price index) annual data 1990-2010: World Development
Indicators.
- Government Consumption to GDP annual data 1990-2010: World Development
Indicators.
- Government Ownership of Banks: Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001 updated in 2008).
- Legal origin from La Porta, Lopez-DeSilanes and Shleifer (1997) and Harper and
Mc Nulty (2008). A dummy variable of one is assigned for French legal origin and
zero otherwise.
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- Gross Domestic Capital Formation/ to DP annual data 1990-2010: World
Development Indicators.
- Net Secondary Enrolment Ratio annual data 1990-2010: World Development
Indicators.
- Conflict Dummy Variable: takes on a value of 1 if a country experienced a conflict
during the period under study, and zero otherwise. From the Encyclopedia of
Conflicts Since World War II edited by Ciment J (2006).
- Religious fractionalisation 2001: from Alesina A, Devleeschauwer A, Easterly W,
Kurlat S and Wacziarg R (2003).
- Population growth rate annual data 1990-2010: World Development Indicators.

Countries in the Sample
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin,
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, China, Congo, Costa Rica,
Cote d’Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgz Republic, Lao, Latvia, Lebanon,
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius,
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,
Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone,
Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria,
Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Vanuatu, Venezuela,
Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia.

35

Table 1: Migrant Remittances and Financial Sector Size and Efficiency:
OLS Estimation

Independent Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

Deposit
Money Bank
Assets/
GDP

Private
Credit/GDP

Liquid
Assets/GDP

(4)
Overhead
Costs

(5)
Net Interest
Margin

Log GDP Per Capita

0.028
0.039
0.062
-0.004
-0.004
(0.006)***
(0.010)***
(0.015)***
(0.002)**
(0.001)***
Remittances
0.030
0.028
0.022
- 0.004
-0.005
(0.004)***
(0.006)*
(0.007)***
(0.002)**
(0.002)***
Exports
0.130
0.140
0.132
-0.008
-0.015
(0.018)***
(0.035)***
(0.029)***
(0.003)***
(0.007)**
FDI
0.006
0.011
0.011
-0.002
- 0.003
(0.004)
(0.005)*
(0.010)
(0.001)**
(0.001)***
Inflation
-0.043
-0.044
-0.065
0.010
0.012
(0.010)***
(0.017)***
(0.011)***
(0.006)*
(0.006)**
Exchange Rate
- 0.025
-0.005
- 0.042
0.005
0.006
Regime Dummy
(0.015)*
(0.024)
(0.018)**
(0.004)
(0.003)*
Intercept
0.416
0.215
0.043
0.081
0.070
(0.075)***
(0.046)***
(0.144)
(0.013)***
(0.030)**
R2
0.30
0.25
0.32
0.30
0.33
Observations
1021
1035
1020
900
912
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by region reported in parenthesis. ***, **, *, significant at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 2: Migrant Remittances and Financial Sector Size and Efficiency with
Additional Control Variables: OLS Estimation

Independent
Variables

Log GDP Per
Capita
Remittances
French Legal Origin
Dummy
Exports
FDI
Exchange Rate
Dummy
Inflation
Population growth
Secondary
Schooling
Govt. Consumption
Gross Domestic
Capital Formation
Religious
Fractionalisation
Conflict Dummy
Intercept
R2
Observations

(1)
Deposit
Money Bank
Assets/
GDP
0.028
(0.010)***
0.041
(0.008)***
-0.010
(0.024)
0.125
(0.031)***
0.020
(0.018)
-0.064
(0.033)*
-0.063
(0.017)***
0.105
(0.044)**
0.091
(0.030)***
0.010
(0.030)
0.064
(0.032)**
-0.222
(0.244)
-0.044
(0.024)**
0.018
(0.242)
0.57
452

(2)
Private
Credit/GDP

(3)
Liquid
Assets/GDP

(4)
Overhead
Costs

(5)
Net Interest
Margin

0.054
(0.026)**
0.028
(0.008)***
-0.046
(0.027)*
0.152
(0.028)***
0.010
(0.016)
-0.025
(0.012)**
-0.083
(0.020)***
0.120
(0.061)***
0.052
(0.030)*
-0.020
(0.018)
0.044
(0.029)*
-0.221
(0.205)
0.040
(0.041)
0.240
(0.220)
0.42
466

0.091
(0.039)**
0.021
(0.007)***
-0.031
(0.034)
0.145
(0.110)*
0.025
(0.014)*
-0.112
(0.045)
-0.113
(0.025)***
0.056
(0.032)*
0.124
(0.053)**
0.028
(0.010)***
0.040
(0.047)
-0.085
(0.088)
-0.054
(0.020)***
0.126
(0.122)
0.50
458

-0.008
(0.003)***
-0.003
(0.001)**
0.020
(0.009)**
-0.009
(0.003)***
0.005
(0.008)
0.014
(0.005)***
0.010
(0.005)**
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.012
(0.004)***
0.008
(0.004)**
-0.022
(0.011)**
0.014
(0.018)
-0.006
(0.003)*
0.125
(0.114)
0.43
446

-0.015
(0.006)***
-0.003
(0.001)**
0.021
(0.005)***
-0.015
(0.006)***
-0.004
(0.002)
0.010
(0.005)**
0.012
(0.006)**
0.006
(0.003)*
-0.011
(0.003)***
0.004
(0.005)
0.005
(0.003)*
0.027
(0.010)***
-0.005
(0.003)*
0.110
(0.017)***
0.45
448

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by region reported in parenthesis. ***, **, *, significant at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 3: Migrant Remittances and Financial Sector Size and Efficiency: System
GMM Estimation

Independent
Variables

Log GDP Per
Capita
Remittances
Exports
FDI
Exchange Rate
Dummy
Inflation
Lag of Dependent
Variable
Intercept
Sargan Test for
over-identifying
restriction: p value
2nd Order
Autocorrelation: p
value
Observations

(1)
Deposit
Money Bank
Assets/
GDP
0.120
(0.057)**
0.010
(0.004)***
0.010
(0.050)**
0.003
(0.003)
-0.113
(0.059)**
-0.011
(0.004)***
0.856
(0.090)***
0.568
(0.294)***

(2)
Private
Credit/GDP

(3)
Liquid
Assets/GDP

(4)
Overhead
Costs

(5)
Net Interest
Margin

0.122
(0.050)***
0.025
(0.010)***
0.034
(0.010)***
0.003
(0.001)***
-0.54
(0.020)***
-0.012
(0.005)***
0.844
(0.087)***
0.364
(0.099)***

0.032
(0.019)*
0.011
(0.004)***
0.037
(0.010)***
0.002
(0.001)*
-0.010
(0.030)
-0.003
(0.001)*
0.856
(0.076)***
0.290
(0.074)***

-0.002
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.001)***
-0.005
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.001)*
0.025
(0.010)***
0.002
(0.001)*
0.468
(0.134)***
0.027
(0.029)

-0.012
(0.007)*
-0.004
(0.001)***
-0.012
(0.006)**
-0.001
(0.001)
0.029
(0.022)
0.003
(0.001)***
0.478
(0.067)***
-0.410
(0.215)**

0.18

0.20

0.23

0.27

0.21

0.23

0.19

0.17

0.16

0.18

1021
1035
1020
900
912
Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis. ***, **, *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively. The difference equation is instrumented with the lagged levels, two periods, of the
dependent variable and the levels equation with the difference lagged one period. Time specific fixed
effects are included as regressors.
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Table 4: Migrant Remittances and Financial Sector Size and Efficiency with
Additional Control Variables: System GMM
Independent
Variables

Log GDP Per
Capita
Remittances
French Legal Origin
Dummy
Exports
FDI
Exchange Rate
Dummy
Inflation
Population growth
Secondary
Schooling
Govt. Consumption
Gross Domestic
Capital Formation
Religious
Fractionalisation
Conflict Dummy
Lag of Dependent
Variable
Intercept
Sargan Test for
over-identifying
restriction: p value
Arellano-Bond Test
for 2nd Order
Autocorrelation: p
value
Observations

(1)
Deposit
Money Bank
Assets/
GDP
0.036
(0.016)*
0.029
(0.010)***
-0.043
(0.038)
0.110
(0.040)***
0.011
(0.000)
-0.247
(0.075)***
-0.025
(0.008)***
0.020
(0.018)
0.045
(0.012)**
0.043
(0.046)
0.167
(0.047)***
-0.249
(0.242)
-0.145
(0.075)**
0.875
(0.240)***
0.475
(0.405)
0.30

(2)
Private
Credit/GDP

(3)
Liquid
Assets/GDP

(4)
Overhead
Costs

(5)
Net Interest
Margin

0.022
(0.015)*
0.026
(0.010)***
-0.120
(0.053)**
0.020
(0.010)**
0.003
(0.003)
-0.236
(0.035)***
-0.009
(0.003)**
0.006
(0.006)
0.017
(0.009)*
-0.006
(0.027)
0.045
(0.022)**
-0.011
(0.116)
0.018
(0.015)
0.881
(0.143)***
0.230
(0.211)
0.24

0.025
(0.013)**
0.020
(0.007)***
-0.021
(0.025)
0.025
(0.014)*
0.008
(0.003)***
-0.056
(0.035)*
-0.005
(0.003)
0.007
(0.006)
0.023
(0.012)*
0.025
(0.021)
0.018
(0.019)
-0.310
(0.056)***
-0.004
(0.035)
0.865
(0.142)***
0.444
(0.246)**
0.25

-0.004
(0.001)***
-0.004
(0.001)***
0.135
(0.020)*
-0.005
(0.006)
0.002
(0.002)
0.035
(0.032)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.003
(0.003)
-0.009
(0.004)**
0.015
(0.013)
-0.030
(0.010)***
0.054
(0.023)**
-0.012
(0.015)
0.365
(0.089)***
0.011
(0.070)
0.23

-0.007
(0.004)*
-0.008
(0.003)***
0.040
(0.066)
-0.009
(0.010)
-0.002
(0.001)**
0.014
(0.020)
0.003
(0.001)*
0.003
(0.003)
-0.018
(0.011)*
0.015
(0.012)
-0.010
(0.005)*
0.113
(0.126)
-0.024
(0.012)*
0.354
(0.125)***
0.108
(0.107)
0.26

0.26

0.30

0.43

0.23

0.25

452

466

458

446

448

Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis. ***, **, *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively. The difference equation is instrumented with the lagged levels, two periods, of the
dependent variable and the levels equation with the difference lagged one period. Time specific fixed
effects are included as regressors.
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Table 5: Bank Ownership, Migrant Remittances and Financial Sector
Development: System GMM
Independent
Variables

Log GDP Per
Capita
Remittances
Exports
FDI
Exchange Rate
Dummy
Inflation
Government
Ownership*
Remittances
Intercept
Lag of Dependent
Variable
Sargan Test for
over-identifying
restriction: p value
Arellano-Bond Test
for 2nd Order
Autocorrelation: p
value
Observations

(1)
Deposit
Money Bank
Assets/
GDP
0.147
(0.055)***
0.026
(0.010)***
0.211
(0.043)***
0.006
(0.007)
-0.346
(0.190)**
-0.007
(0.012)
-0.005
(0.001)***

(2)
Private
Credit/GDP

(3)
Liquid
Assets/GDP

(4)
Overhead
Costs

(5)
Net Interest
Margin

0.256
(0.137)**
0.028
(0.010)***
0.143
(0.029)***
0.029
(0.008)***
-0.290
(0.083)***
-0.015
(0.006)***
-0.003
(0.001)***

0.059
(0.028)**
0.020
(0.010)**
0.112
(0.060)**
0.004
(0.005)
-0.410
(0.347)
-0.004
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.002)

-0.003
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.001)**
-0.005
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.032
(0.035)
0.002
(0.001)*
-0.006
(0.003)**

-0.007
(0.016)
-0.006
(0.002)***
-0.010
(0.005)*
-0.002
(0.001)*
0.020
(0.025)
0.003
(0.001)**
-0.020
(0.010)**

0.210
0.320)
0.997
(0.055)***
0.22

0.250
(0.212)
0.845
(0.026)***
0.26

10.935
(0.823)
0.933
(0.035)***
0.24

0.045
(0.049)
0.523
(0.098)***
0.21

0.020
(0.023)
0.389
(0.075)***
0.20

0.45

0.24

0.24

0.27

0.24

620

622

644

568

560

Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis. ***, **, *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively. The difference equation is instrumented with the lagged levels, two periods, of the
dependent variable and the levels equation with the difference lagged one period. Time specific fixed
effects are included as regressors.
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Table 6: Bank Ownership, Migrant Remittances and Financial Sector
Development Disaggregated by Government Ownership of Banks: System GMM
(1)
High Government Bank Ownership Group
Independent Variables
Deposit Money
Bank Assets/
GDP
Log GDP Per Capita
0.140
(0.035)***
Remittances
0.021
(0.010)**
Exports
0.124
(0.030)***
FDI
0.005
(0.006)
Exchange Rate
-0.367
Dummy
(0.097)***
Inflation
-0.006
(0.006)
Lag of Dependent
0.852
Variable
(0.230)***
Intercept
0.356
(0.326)
0.42
Sargan Test for overidentifying restriction:
p value
Arellano-Bond Test for 0.24
2nd Order
Autocorrelation: p
value
Observations
300
Low Government Bank Ownership Group
Deposit Money
Bank Assets/
GDP
Log GDP Per Capita
0.113
(0.020)***
Remittances
0.037
(0.009)***
Exports
0.042
(0.025)*
FDI
0.005
(0.005)
Exchange Rate
-0.114
Dummy
(0.013)
Inflation
-0.017
(0.007)***
Lag of Dependent
0.820
Variable
(0.097)***
Intercept
0.300
(0.324)
0.20
Sargan Test for overidentifying restriction:
p value
Arellano-Bond Test for 0.27
2nd Order
Autocorrelation: p
value
Observations
320

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Private
Credit/GDP

Liquid
Assets/GDP

Overhead Costs

Net Interest
Margin

0.202
(0.048)***
0.020
(0.010)**
0.126
(0.026)***
0.003
(0.002)
-0.332
(0.088)***
-0.008
(0.006)
0.845
(0.228)***
0.812
(0.226)***
0.24

0.045
(0.029)*
0.006
(0.006)
0.118
(0.028)***
0.004
(0.005)
-0.035
(0.041)
-0.010
(0.004)**
0.821
(0.131)***
0.220
(0.254)
0.28

-0.002
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.001)***
-0.006
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.030
(0.029)
0.002
(0.001)*
0.357
(0.144)***
0.031
(0.051)
0.23

-0.003
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.001)***
-0.015
(0.006)***
-0.001
(0.001)
0.019
(0.015)
0.004
(0.001)***
0.451
(0.151)***
0.054
(0.055)
0.22

0.023

0.25

0.28

0.23

300

312

280

274

Private
Credit/GDP

Liquid
Assets/GDP

Overhead Costs

Net Interest
Margin

0.031
(0.034)
0.028
(0.014)**
0.036
(0.014)***
0.034
(0.005)***
-0.420
(0.150)***
-0.030
(0.010)***
0.867
(0.129)***
0.115
(0.246)
0.19

0.056
(0.022)***
0.019
(0.007)***
0.051
(0.025)**
0.004
(0.005)
-0.380
(0.170)**
-0.004
(0.005)
0.897
(0.130)***
0.265
(0.180)***
0.19

-0.018
(0.006)***
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.001)*
0.112
(0.111)
0.003
(0.001)***
0.624
(0.134)***
0.125
(0.150)
0.24

-0.004
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.012
(0.005)***
-0.002
(0.001)**
0.017
(0.015)
0.002
(0.001)***
0.320
(0.171)***
0.125
(0.046)***
0.23

0.23

0.24

0.26

0.28

322

332

288

286

Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis. ***, **, *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively. The difference equation is instrumented with the lagged levels, two periods, of the
dependent variable and the levels equation with the difference lagged one period. Time specific fixed
effects are included as regressors.
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